Two Norms of Intention: a Vindication of Williamson’s Knowledge-Action Analogy
Autor: | Frank Hofmann |
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Rok vydání: | 2021 |
Předmět: | |
Zdroj: | Acta Analytica. 36:563-572 |
ISSN: | 1874-6349 0353-5150 |
Popis: | According to an important analogy between knowledge and action, as proposed by Timothy Williamson, intention aims at (intentional) action just as belief aims at knowledge. This paper investigates the analogy and discusses three difficulties that it has to face. The key is to distinguish between two different norms of intention and to see that the knowledge-action analogy is concerned with one of them only, namely, the realization norm: one ought to intentionally act if one intends to act in a certain way. A modification will be proposed that replaces intention by correct intention, and some work will be done with the aim of uncovering a frame for how to properly understand the analogy and what it ultimately is grounded on, namely, the normativity of capacities that are in the business of generating various states (beliefs, intentions) and of realizing one’s correct intentions. Thus, a modified knowledge-action analogy will be vindicated in the end. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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