Qualitative relationism about subject and object of perception and experience
| Autor: | Andrea Pace Giannotta |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Philosophy of mind
Cognitive Neuroscience media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Illusion Metaphysics Internalism and externalism Neutral monism 06 humanities and the arts Externalism 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology Epistemology Philosophy Perception 060302 philosophy 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Monism Psychology media_common |
| Zdroj: | Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 21:583-602 |
| ISSN: | 1572-8676 1568-7759 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11097-020-09710-1 |
| Popis: | In this paper, I compare various theories of perception in relation to the question of the epistemological and ontological status of the qualities that appear in perceptual experience. I group these theories into two main views: quality externalism and quality internalism, and I highlight their contrasting problems in accounting for phenomena such as perceptual relativity, illusions and hallucinations (the “problem of perception”). Then, I propose an alternative view, which I call qualitative relationism and which conceives of the subject and the object of perceptual experience as essentially related to one another (hence relationism) in a process of co-constitution out of fundamental qualities (hence qualitative relationism). I lend support to this view by drawing on Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, which I complement with a form of neutral monism. I argue that the investigation of the temporal structure of perceptual experience leads us to find at its heart a qualitative process that is more fundamental than the two relata of perception and that gives rise to them. Then, I extend this account of perception into a general theory of intentionality and experience and I develop its implications into a neutral monist metaphysics. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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