Great Power Intervention and War
| Autor: | Scott Wolford |
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| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | International Studies Quarterly. 67 |
| ISSN: | 1468-2478 0020-8833 |
| Popis: | Great powers often extract concessions whether they intervene during or after other states’ wars. I analyze crisis bargaining between two primary disputants and a great power that may intervene to extract concessions from the victor. When disputants face commitment problems, the threat of intervention discourages declining states from attacking and enables rising states to make otherwise-incredible commitments to avoid war. When disputants face information problems, uninformed states find risking war less attractive, and informed states accept less favorable proposals, regardless of their private information. The mechanism by which the threat of intervention discourages war depends on great powers’ military reach and the side(s) against which they intervene. The model shows how (i) changing great power capabilities can lead to the outbreak of war between other states, (ii) these effects are mediated by hierarchical relationships, and (iii) great powers can create international order not with principle but with selfishness. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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