Tax competition and tax base equalization in the presence of multiple tax instruments

Autor:	Mutsumi Matsumoto
Rok vydání:	2021
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Government Horizontal and vertical Tax competition Single tax ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING Monetary economics Entitlement ComputingMilieux_GENERAL Accounting Capital (economics) Economics Finance Externality Public finance
Zdroj:	International Tax and Public Finance. 29:1213-1226
ISSN:	1573-6970 0927-5940
DOI:	10.1007/s10797-021-09703-z
Popis:	The literature on tax competition has argued that tax base equalization, which reduces regional disparities in tax bases, can serve as a means of internalizing horizontal and vertical fiscal externalities. This argument assumes that each government relies on a single tax base (a regional tax on mobile capital and a federal tax on savings). This paper considers the case in which a distortionary labor tax is also available. Internalizing fiscal externalities requires that while the regional capital tax base is fully equalized, a region’s equalization entitlement for the labor tax is positive when its tax base is “larger” than the average tax base of all regions. This efficient tax base equalization system is incompatible with the primary objective of fiscal equalization.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ad635295ef29df96fbb7332d1cb43fdf https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-021-09703-z Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full text from SpringerLink