Block Investment and Partial Benefits of Corporate Control

Autor:	Jeffrey Zwiebel
Rok vydání:	1995
Předmět:	Microeconomics Structure (mathematical logic) Economics and Econometrics Shareholder Block (programming) Control (management) Economics Space (commercial competition) Empirical evidence Investment (macroeconomics) Industrial organization
Zdroj:	The Review of Economic Studies. 62:161-185
ISSN:	1467-937X 0034-6527
DOI:	10.2307/2297801
Popis:	are much smaller than what is generally considered necessary for control. This paper develops a theory whereby such blocks can confer to their holders partial benefits of control; in particular, small block shareholders can join together and form controlling coalitions. The implications of such a cooperative game among block shareholders for the shareholder structure within and across firms are examined. This paper predicts large investors will "create their own space" by staking out large enough blocks to deter other block investors, there will be a threshold level above which large investors are not challenged, and that the shareholder structure across firms will exhibit a particular clientele effect among block shareholders. These predictions are consistent with a preliminary review of empirical evidence.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ad480dee597be46c77f022f2f8290872 https://doi.org/10.2307/2297801 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF