Impact of Cyberattacks on Precision Time Protocol
| Autor: | Steve Guendert, Casimer M. DeCusatis, William Paul Kluge, Wojciak Paul, John Houston, Robert M. Lynch |
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| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Authentication
Network architecture Computer science business.industry 020208 electrical & electronic engineering 02 engineering and technology Construct (python library) Synchronization Synchronization (computer science) 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Message authentication code Electrical and Electronic Engineering System time Precision Time Protocol business Instrumentation Protocol (object-oriented programming) Computer network |
| Zdroj: | IEEE Transactions on Instrumentation and Measurement. 69:2172-2181 |
| ISSN: | 1557-9662 0018-9456 |
| DOI: | 10.1109/tim.2019.2918597 |
| Popis: | The IEEE 1588 standard known as Precision Time Protocol (PTP) was developed to provide highly accurate and synchronized clocks for a wide range of applications. In particular, it is critical for latency-sensitive applications, such as enterprise-class financial transactions. In this paper, we analyze some of the security risks associated with this protocol, in particular, cyberattacks that disrupt the synchronization between multiple PTP devices or the synchronization between system clock and PTP hardware. We construct an experimental PTP test bed and perform the baseline measurements of synchronization between multiple clocks. We then demonstrate successful attacks that disrupt PTP synchronization, including vulnerabilities based on the lack of message authentication between master and slave clocks. Proposed mitigations of these vulnerabilities are discussed, in an effort to improve the next-generation implementations of this timing protocol or recommend additional external authentication devices in the network architecture. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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