Rivalry among agents seeking large budgets

Autor:	Amihai Glazer, Kimiko Terai
Rok vydání:	2018
Předmět:	Sociology and Political Science Delegation media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Principal (computer security) 0506 political science Microeconomics 0502 economics and business 050602 political science & public administration Business 050207 economics Rivalry Reputation media_common
Zdroj:	Journal of Theoretical Politics. 30:388-409
ISSN:	1460-3667 0951-6298
DOI:	10.1177/0951629818791029
Popis:	An agent competing for resources from a principal may benefit from having the principal believe that the agent shares his preferences, whereas the principal may prefer that agents reveal their types, inducing a separating equilibrium. Such incentives are explored in a model with a principal who sets a budget in two separate periods, and two different agents allocate that budget among services. In the second period, the principal allocates a larger budget to the agent that he believes is more likely to share his preferences. In the first period, each agent may behave strategically, spending more on the service the principal prefers, thereby hiding the agent’s type; this benefits the principal in the current period, but hurts him in the future because he does not know which agent would spend in the way he prefers. The principal may induce separation by giving the agents a large budget in the initial period, or by hiding his preferences from them.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ac522758a56870961eb5068373a8fd81 https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629818791029 Zobrazit plný text záznamu