Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
| Autor: | Lars Ehlers, Arunava Sen, Dipjyoti Majumdar, Debasis Mishra |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Mathematical optimization Mechanism design Computer science Applied Mathematics media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Domain (software engineering) Incentive compatibility Voting 0502 economics and business 050206 economic theory Mechanism (sociology) 050205 econometrics media_common |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Mathematical Economics. 88:31-41 |
| ISSN: | 0304-4068 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.02.004 |
| Popis: | In models without transfers, we show that every cardinal incentive compatible voting mechanism satisfying a continuity condition, can only take ordinal, but not cardinal information into account. Our results apply to many standard models in mechanism design without transfers, including the standard voting models with any domain restrictions. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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