Autor: |
Tanja Thiele, Alexander Kempf, Stefan Ruenzi |
Rok vydání: |
2009 |
Předmět: |
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Zdroj: |
Journal of Financial Economics. 92:92-108 |
ISSN: |
0304-405X |
Popis: |
We examine the influence on managerial risk taking of incentives due to employment risk and due to compensation. Our empirical investigation of the risk taking behavior of mutual fund managers indicates that managerial risk taking crucially depends on the relative importance of these incentives. When employment risk is more important than compensation incentives, fund managers with a poor midyear performance tend to decrease risk relative to leading managers to prevent potential job loss. When employment risk is low, compensation incentives become more relevant and fund managers with a poor midyear performance increase risk to catch up with the midyear winners. |
Databáze: |
OpenAIRE |
Externí odkaz: |
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