Employment risk, compensation incentives, and managerial risk taking: Evidence from the mutual fund industry

Autor:	Tanja Thiele, Alexander Kempf, Stefan Ruenzi
Rok vydání:	2009
Předmět:	Risk compensation Economics and Econometrics Labour economics Incentive business.industry Strategy and Management Accounting Compensation (psychology) Business Risk taking Job loss Finance Mutual fund
Zdroj:	Journal of Financial Economics. 92:92-108
ISSN:	0304-405X
Popis:	We examine the influence on managerial risk taking of incentives due to employment risk and due to compensation. Our empirical investigation of the risk taking behavior of mutual fund managers indicates that managerial risk taking crucially depends on the relative importance of these incentives. When employment risk is more important than compensation incentives, fund managers with a poor midyear performance tend to decrease risk relative to leading managers to prevent potential job loss. When employment risk is low, compensation incentives become more relevant and fund managers with a poor midyear performance increase risk to catch up with the midyear winners.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::aa959cad94ba5cd7b086d5465dc67904 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.05.001 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full Text from ScienceDirect