| Autor: |
Jeffrey A. Born, Hugo J. Faria, Emery A. Trahan |
| Rok vydání: |
1999 |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Managerial Finance. 25:13-21 |
| ISSN: |
0307-4358 |
| DOI: |
10.1108/03074359910766190 |
| Popis: |
Explains why executive severance contracts contingent on a change in control (i.e. golden parachutes) have developed and reviews previous relevant research. Develops a mathematical model of their effects on shareholder wealth and uses it to determine an optimal contract which aligns the interests of shareholders and managers (i.e. where marginal benefit to shareholders equals marginal cost of the contract). Points out that these contracts alone do not guarantee that managers will aim to maximize shareholders wealth: they should form only part of a package of compensation agreements to align their interests. |
| Databáze: |
OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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