FREEDOM HAS NO INTRINSIC VALUE: LIBERALISM AND VOLUNTARISM

Autor:	Jeffrey S. Friedman
Rok vydání:	2013
Předmět:	Liberalism Literature and Literary Theory Action (philosophy) Embodied cognition Philosophy Political Science and International Relations Intrinsic value (animal ethics) Subject (philosophy) Voluntarism (action) Deontological ethics Law and economics
Zdroj:	Critical Review. 25:38-85
ISSN:	1933-8007 0891-3811
DOI:	10.1080/08913811.2013.832492
Popis:	Deontological (as opposed to consequentialist) liberals treat freedom of action as an end in itself, not a means to other ends. Yet logically, when one makes a deliberate choice, one treats freedom of action as if it were not an end in itself, for one uses this freedom as a means to the ends one hopes to achieve through one's action. The tension between deontology and the logic of choice is reflected in the paradoxical nature of the “right to do wrong”; and in Rawls's unsuccessful attempts to justify to acting agents their interest in such a right, embodied in his conception of agents as “self-validating sources of claims.” A self-validating source of claims is akin to God as envisioned by voluntarist theologians such as Ockham. Leibniz's critique of voluntarism, then, is applicable to the Rawlsian subject: like the voluntarist God, she would be unable to act if it were indeed the case that her action validated itself.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::aa403686726df8e047ea20c166012e0c https://doi.org/10.1080/08913811.2013.832492 Zobrazit plný text záznamu