Breaking the deadlock:Guarantees in International Mediation

Autor:	Raymond Cohen
Rok vydání:	2001
Předmět:	business.industry media_common.quotation_subject Deadlock Dilemma Negotiation Argument Law Political Science and International Relations Mediation Economics business Settlement (litigation) Bad faith Risk management media_common Law and economics
Zdroj:	Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 14:39-52
ISSN:	1474-449X 0955-7571
DOI:	10.1080/09557570108400355
Popis:	This article examines the problem of overcoming strategic deadlock in international negotiations for the resolution of protracted conflict. Deadlocks are prolonged periods of immobility that may result from acute uncertainty associated with doubts about the reliability of one's negotiating partner. When the parties are paralysed by mistrust, third‐party guarantees can facilitate a breakthrough in negotiations by acting as instruments of risk management. In game theoretical terms, they guarantee the players against defection in prisoner's dilemma situations and permit mutual cooperation. By providing an external sanction against the other side's bad faith, international guarantees lower the risks attached both to the negotiation itself and to the envisaged settlement. The theoretical argument is demonstrated with reference to the 1975 Egyptian‐Israeli disengagement talks. Here, American guarantees proved crucial in breaking a prolonged deadlock that had developed.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a9daf4edb10d7d8d9a520012e344b026 https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570108400355 Zobrazit plný text záznamu