Reciprocity—an indirect evolutionary analysis

Autor:	Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Christian Korth, Stefan Napel
Rok vydání:	2007
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Ultimatum game Stochastic game Strong reciprocity General Business Management and Accounting Impunity game Social preferences symbols.namesake Dictator game Nash equilibrium Economics symbols Mathematical economics Reciprocity (cultural anthropology)
Zdroj:	Journal of Evolutionary Economics. 17:579-603
ISSN:	1432-1386 0936-9937
DOI:	10.1007/s00191-006-0053-1
Popis:	In experimental investigations of the ultimatum game, participants quite consistently offer 30–50% of an available monetary surplus as first-moving proposers. They reject offers of less than 20% as second-moving responders, which results in zero payoff for both players. Particularly the latter observation is hard to reconcile with the assumption that economic actors are rational maximizers of their monetary payoffs.1 However, observations can be explained very well by including a consideration for fairness and reciprocity in players’ preferences. This is also true regarding many other games for which experimental findings are puzzling from a monetary-payoff maximization point of view.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a8c80bf8e848ed402b61aac1f6e55877 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-006-0053-1 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF