| Popis: |
When remittance inflows increase, incumbent approval will also increase, but when these payments decline, recipients will punish incumbents. This reflects the following statement from the paper's abstract: "Relying on a unique four-wave panel study of Kyrgyz citizens between 2010–2013 and a cross-sectional sample of 28 countries in Central Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, we show that when people experience a decrease (increase) in remittances, they become less (more) satisfied about their household economic situation and misattribute responsibility to the incumbent at home." The claim is tested with panel survey data from the 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 waves of the LiKsurvey, which tracks the same 3,000 households in all seven Kyrgyz oblasts (regions) and the two cities of Bishkek and Osh. The dependent variable is the difference in levels of trust in the President across survey waves. In the model chosen as evidence for the SCORE program (Model 1 of Table 2), the main independent variable is changes in the amount of remitted income. The regression analysis is based on a panel data model that accounts for repeated observations of individuals and includes both household and survey wave fixed effects, as well as additional controls listed in Table 2. The results show that an increase in remittances coincides with an increase in trust in the president, while a decrease in remittances decreases trust in the president (coefficient on Change in Amount of Remittances term = 0.048, SE = 0.019, p ≤ 0.05). The focal test in the original paper is: coefficient on Change in Amount of Remittances term = 0.048, SE = 0.019, p ≤ 0.05 |
