Third parties in equilibrium: comment and correction

Autor:	Haldun Evrenk
Rok vydání:	2008
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Correlated equilibrium Sociology and Political Science Trembling hand perfect equilibrium Symmetric equilibrium symbols.namesake Equilibrium selection Nash equilibrium Economics symbols Epsilon-equilibrium Risk dominance Solution concept Mathematical economics
Zdroj:	Public Choice. 139:121-124
ISSN:	1573-7101 0048-5829
DOI:	10.1007/s11127-008-9382-y
Popis:	Published in a past issue of this journal, Hug (Public Choice 82:159–180, 1995) studies political competition among three vote-maximizing parties when voters cannot know exactly which policies the parties will adopt when elected. Contrary to what is claimed in Proposition 3, in the generic case the game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. In this case, only a local Nash equilibrium (LNE) may exist, but due to an incorrect second order condition, the conditions in Proposition 3 do not characterize this LNE either.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a7266d534dc2e29c77fd7c10a98605b0 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9382-y Zobrazit plný text záznamu