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Due to both carbon policy and consumer environmental awareness, the large amount of carbon emissions generated while keeping deteriorating products fresh has attracted attention. In particular, under international competition, both freshness and environmental friendliness have significant effects on the market demand for deteriorating products. Furthermore, considering harmonious economic and environmental development, many recent studies take social welfare as the optimization goal. However, due to the trade-offs between the freshness and environmental friendliness of deteriorating products, how should the government formulate a reasonable carbon policy to guide cold chain members to make optimal decisions on freshness-keeping efforts and carbon abatement to improve social welfare and reduce carbon emissions? Against this backdrop, in this study, considering cap-and-trade regulations and consumers’ preference for low-carbon fresh products, we develop tripartite game models consisting of the government, one emission-dependent supplier and one retailer in a two-echelon cold chain system. Two models are developed to compare the optimal decisions under two scenarios: when the supplier purchases carbon quotas and when the supplier adopts carbon abatement technology. Conducting theoretical analysis and numerical experiments, we obtain the following main insights: (1) The adoption of carbon abatement technologies does not always create greater social welfare, and there is a boundary between the two scenarios. (2) Production costs and freshness-keeping costs have the greatest influence on social welfare and unit carbon emissions. (3) The government should implement a looser carbon policy for deteriorating products with higher price elasticity. (4) The most effective way to simultaneously improve social welfare and reduce total carbon emissions is to increase consumer environmental awareness and reduce the abatement cost exponent. |
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