| Popis: |
Since the fall of Siad Barre’s regime in January 1991, political stability and durable peace continue to elude the state and the people of Somalia. The Somali conflict has defied easy resolution due to the interplay of a plethora of endogenous and exogenous dynamics that make third-party peacemaking and peacekeeping interventions daunting. The outbreak of hostilities more than two decades ago and the preceding years of clan- based, armed insurgency that ended Barre’s 21-year dictatorship have meant the deaths of tens of thousands of Somalis, while the number of refugees and IDPs is increasing.1 The war is one of the most protracted in the world, and it has oscillated in terms of its intensity, the nature of belligerents involved, and its dimensions and dynamics (Dersso 2009). Its current phase has pitted the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)2 against al-Qaeda-affiliated Harakat al-Shabab al Mujahideen (Movement of Warrior Youth) — al-Shabaab, for short3 — Hizbul Islam (Party of Islam),4 and other Islamist militant groups. Due to the complexity of the Somali war, the UN and Western governments are reluctant to involve troops in any peacekeeping operation in Somalia, partly because of the conflict’s complex nature and partly because of Somali armed groups’ aversion to external intervention forces. |
