| Popis: |
Quantum mechanics was but scantily discussed by philosophers before WWII. Even the Bohr-Einstein debate and the 1935 EPR “paradox” were largely ignored, presumably on the assumption that Bohr’s reply settled any philosophical debate. The complacency was uprooted by D. Bohm in 1952, one response to which was the birth of the “Copenhagen interpretation”. Responding to L. Rosenfeld’s defense of the new orthodoxy, P.K. Feyerabend launched a critique of empiricism and positivism, coinciding in part with T.S. Kuhn’s post-positivist philosophy of science yet rejecting the key concepts of “normal science” and “paradigm” as anti-progressive dogma redolent of Copenhagen. Feyerabend’s advocacy of theoretical and methodological pluralism from 1960 to 1975 became increasingly radical, prompting other pluralisms and relativisms, currents that publicly surfaced in the “science wars” of the 1990s. In a dialectically opposite direction, Bohm’s theory inspired an “experimental metaphysics” after J.S. Bell’s papers (1964-66) demonstrating a local realist theory will empirically contradict quantum mechanics. |
