Rational Fouls? Loss aversion on organizational and individual goals influence decision quality
| Autor: | Nils Rudi, Anup Walvekar, Henrich R. Greve |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
business.industry Strategy and Management Decision theory media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Decision quality Microeconomics Management of Technology and Innovation Loss aversion 0502 economics and business Organizational learning Observational learning Quality (business) 050207 economics Psychology business 050203 business & management media_common |
| Zdroj: | Organization Studies. 42:1031-1051 |
| ISSN: | 1741-3044 0170-8406 |
| Popis: | When organizational tasks require accurate decision-making, it is of interest to examine the quality of decisions in general, and specifically the conditions under which it deteriorates. Many important decisions are made by individuals at work who are hired to pursue organizational goals but also have individual goals, but the potential effects of having two goal sets has not seen enough theoretical and empirical treatment. We are particularly interested in the effects of organizational and individual goals leading to loss framing in decision-making, and in their interaction. We take predictions on loss aversion that have been explored most extensively in experimental studies and investigate them in a high-stakes field context involving organizations: football (soccer) in a European top division. We show that fouls (destructive play) are made rationally overall, and with reductions in rationality that follow the predictions of prospect theory. We show that the main mechanism behind the findings is that decision-making in a loss frame is less sensitive to cost/benefit calculations. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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