| Popis: |
In a resurgence of state capitalism, governments have encouraged their national oil companies (NOCs) to invest vast sums in foreign oil and gas assets. Existing explanations, including energy security and asymmetric interdependence, fail to consider commercial interests of NOCs. Applying the principal agent model, the chapter introduces the central argument of the book: NOC investments depend on two domestic structural factors. First, democracies limit political and economic capital available for investments, as opposition parties can politicize them. Second, though multiple bureaucratic principals can produce counterproductive NOC behavior, a clear line of authority among them can reduce the danger. The chapter then underscores the book’s theoretical contributions: By calling for a clear line of authority among principals, the book contributes to the bureaucratic performance literature. By considering a wider set of institutional alternatives to privatization in managing NOCs, the book contributes to the resource curse literature. Finally, the chapter previews the book’s empirical contributions, a statistical analysis of NOC investments 2000–2013 and case studies of China, India, Brazil, Norway, and Russia. |
