Optimal Contracts with Randomly Arriving Tasks

Autor:	Alexander Frug, Daniel Bird
Rok vydání:	2020
Předmět:	Structure (mathematical logic) Economics and Econometrics media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Wage Task (project management) Microeconomics Promotion (rank) Work (electrical) 0502 economics and business Business 050207 economics Randomness 050205 econometrics media_common
Zdroj:	The Economic Journal.
ISSN:	1468-0297 0013-0133
DOI:	10.1093/ej/ueaa125
Popis:	Workers are rarely assigned to perform the same task throughout their career. Instead, their assignments may change randomly over time to comply with the fluctuating needs of the organisation where they are employed. In this article, we show that this typical randomness in workplaces has a striking effect on the structure of long-term employment contracts. In particular, simple intertemporal variability in the worker’s tasks is sufficient to generate a rich promotion-based dynamics in which, occasionally, the worker receives a (permanent) wage raise and his future work requirements are reduced.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a2c809809ecd4a9b64fa93390b1dc74e https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa125 Zobrazit plný text záznamu