| Popis: |
Current computer systems are vulnerable to a wide range of attacks caused by the proliferation of accelerators, and the fact that current system comprise multiple SoCs provided from different vendors. Thus, major processor vendors are moving towards limiting the trust boundary to the processor chip only as in Intel's SGX, AMD's SME, and ARM's TrustZone. This secure boundary limitation requires protecting the memory content against data remanence attacks, which were performed against DRAM in the form of cold-boot attack and are more successful against NVM due to NVM's data persistency feature. However, implementing secure memory features, such as memory encryption and integrity verification has a non-trivial performance overhead, and can significantly reduce the emerging NVM's expected lifetime. Previous work looked at reducing the overheads of the secure memory implementation by packing more counters into a cache line, increasing the cacheability of security metadata, slightly reducing the size of the integrity tree, or using the ECC chip to store the MAC values. However, the root update process is barely studied, which requires a sequential update of the MAC values in all the integrity tree levels. In this paper, we propose ProMT, a novel memory controller design that ensures a persistently secure system with minimal overheads. ProMT protects the data confidentiality and ensures the data integrity with minimal overheads. ProMT reduces the performance overhead of secure memory implementation to 11.7%, extends the NVM's life time by 3.59x, and enables the system recovery in a fraction of a second. |
