Do Perverse Insurance Incentives Encourage Coastal Vulnerability?

Autor:	Tracy Kijewski-Correa, Debra Javeline, Angela Chesler
Rok vydání:	2022
Předmět:	Perverse incentive Incentive Public economics Moral hazard Economics Vulnerability General Social Sciences Building and Construction General Environmental Science Civil and Structural Engineering Maladaptation
Zdroj:	Natural Hazards Review. 23
ISSN:	1527-6996 1527-6988
DOI:	10.1061/(asce)nh.1527-6996.0000533
Popis:	Subsidized insurance is often described as a perverse incentive, moral hazard, or maladaptation that perpetuates coastal residencies in vulnerable homes despite increasing safety and econom...
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a27398aa0e60e8b8aef8fdf2828d2a49 https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)nh.1527-6996.0000533 Zobrazit plný text záznamu