Libet-style experiments, neuroscience, and libertarian free will
| Autor: | Marcelo Fischborn |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Libertarianism
Unconscious mind media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Determinism 050105 experimental psychology Hard determinism Epistemology Incompatibilism Style (sociolinguistics) Philosophy 060302 philosophy Fundamental physics Free will 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Psychology Neuroscience Applied Psychology media_common |
| Zdroj: | Philosophical Psychology. 29:494-502 |
| ISSN: | 1465-394X 0951-5089 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/09515089.2016.1141399 |
| Popis: | People have disagreed on the significance of Libet-style experiments for discussions about free will. In what specifically concerns free will in a libertarian sense, some argue that Libet-style experiments pose a threat to its existence by providing support to the claim that decisions are determined by unconscious brain events. Others disagree by claiming that determinism, in a sense that conflicts with libertarian free will, cannot be established by sciences other than fundamental physics. This paper rejects both positions. First, it is argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle provide support for milder deterministic claims that would also conflict with libertarian free will. Second, it is argued that Libet-style experiments—due to some of their peculiar features, ones that need not be shared by neuroscience as a whole—currently do not (but possibly could) support such less demanding deterministic claims. The general result is that neuroscience and psychology could in principle ... |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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