A Criticism of Alasdair MacIntyre’s Account of Narrative Identity. A Neuro-philosophical Perspective
| Autor: | Ali Abedi Renani, Saleh Hasanzadeh, Seyed Ebrahim Sarparast Sadat |
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| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Roczniki Filozoficzne. 70:415-436 |
| ISSN: | 0035-7685 2450-002X |
| DOI: | 10.18290/rf2204.15 |
| Popis: | In MacIntyre’s view, the agent in order to have a consistent identity should be able to narrate a story about her life, which relates the different episodes of her life together. This story should explain the transition between these episodes. This story is based on the notion of the good of human beings. A notion of the good should be present in the agent’s life to give a direction to her life. This integrity forms an identity for the agent. We intend to challenge this narrative view of identity in this paper. We will argue in this paper that though identity is formed in the eye of others, it does not need to be constituted in a unified narrative form, i.e., the agent does not need to place all episodes of her life in narrative order and have a consistent and unified account of her life, which includes her life from birth to death. Rather, shorter-term episodes of time suffice for identity formation. We will appeal to some findings of empirical psychology and neuroscience to support our claim. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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