Career incentives in political hierarchy: evidence from Imperial Russia†
| Autor: | Dmitrii Kofanov, Gunes Gokmen |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
History
Hierarchy media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Economics Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous) Empire 0506 political science Test (assessment) Politics Incentive Political economy 0502 economics and business 050602 political science & public administration Economics 050207 economics Governor Administration (government) Peacekeeping media_common |
| Zdroj: | European Review of Economic History. 24:264-287 |
| ISSN: | 1474-0044 1361-4916 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/ereh/hey033 |
| Popis: | This paper studies political career incentives in a nondemocratic historical setting to assess early political institutions. We construct a novel panel database of governors of Imperial Russia in 91 provinces between 1895 and 1914. Measuring an imperial governor’s performance by his ability of peacekeeping, we test whether the central authorities in the Russian Empire resorted to career incentives to improve the performance of provincial governors. We find that the central administration promoted better performing governors only in the peripheral provinces (oblasts), but not in the main ones (gubernias). In addition, we show that political connections had no significant effect on career prospects. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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