A pluralistic account of epistemic rationality
| Autor: | Matthew Kopec |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Philosophy of science
Philosophy 05 social sciences General Social Sciences Metaphysics Rationality 06 humanities and the arts 050905 science studies 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Sketch Epistemology Philosophy of language Epistemic possibility Pluralism (political theory) Teleology 060302 philosophy 0509 other social sciences |
| Zdroj: | Synthese. 195:3571-3596 |
| ISSN: | 1573-0964 0039-7857 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11229-017-1388-x |
| Popis: | In this essay, I motivate and defend a pluralistic view of epistemic rationality. The core of the view is the notion that epistemic rationality is essentially a species of (teleological) practical rationality that is put in the service of various epistemic goals. First, I sketch some closely related views that have appeared in the literature. Second, I present my preferred, pluralistic version of the view, and I sketch some of its benefits. Third, I defend the view against a prominent objection recently offered against a class of closely related views by Selim Berker. Last, I raise some distinct, lingering worries, and I sketch some possible ways one might address them. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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