Conventional Wisdom? The Effect of Nuclear Proliferation on Armed Conflict, 1945-2001
| Autor: | David Sobek, Dennis M. Foster, Samuel B. Robison |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2012 |
| Předmět: |
Engineering
Sociology and Political Science business.industry fungi Armed conflict social sciences Conventional wisdom Possession (law) Nuclear weapon Nuclear ethics humanities Incentive Law Political economy Political Science and International Relations population characteristics Nuclear proliferation business |
| Zdroj: | International Studies Quarterly. 56:149-162 |
| ISSN: | 0020-8833 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00707.x |
| Popis: | The possession of nuclear weapons confers many benefits on a state. The path to proliferation, however, is often violent. When a state initiates a nuclear weapons program, it signals its intent to fundamentally alter its bargaining environment. States that once had an advantage will now be disadvantaged. This change in the environment is not instantaneous, but evolves slowly over time. This gives states both opportunities and incentives to resolve underlying grievances, by force if necessary, before a nuclear weapons program is completed. Our cross-national analyses of nuclear weapons program and the onset of militarized conflict confirm this expectation. In particular, the closer a state gets to acquiring nuclear weapons, the greater the risk it will be attacked (especially over territorial issues). Once nuclear weapons are acquired, however, the risk of being attacked dramatically drops, though not below the risk of attack for non-proliferators. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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