A modified version of Arrow’s IIA condition

Autor:	Eric Maskin
Rok vydání:	2020
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Feature (computer vision) Economics International political economy Arrow Independence of irrelevant alternatives Mathematical economics Social Sciences (miscellaneous) Preference Public finance
Zdroj:	Social Choice and Welfare. 54:203-209
ISSN:	1432-217X 0176-1714
DOI:	10.1007/s00355-020-01241-7
Popis:	I propose a modified version of Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives condition (IIA). The new version preserves the most attractive feature of traditional IIA, viz., that it rules out vote-splitting in elections (in which two or more popular candidates split the vote, allowing a relatively unpopular candidate to win). Moreover, it permits election outcomes to reflect voters' preference intensities, unlike the traditional condition.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9de1f90189b9ee103d144f0f00c2d53d https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01241-7 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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