How interventionist accounts of causation work in experimental practice and why there is no need to worry about supervenience
| Autor: | Tudor M. Baetu |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Philosophy of science
Interpretation (philosophy) 05 social sciences General Social Sciences 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion Supervenience Interventionism (medicine) Outcome (game theory) 050105 experimental psychology Dilemma Philosophy of language Philosophy 060302 philosophy 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Positive economics Causation Psychology |
| Zdroj: | Synthese. 199:4601-4620 |
| ISSN: | 1573-0964 0039-7857 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11229-020-02993-6 |
| Popis: | It has been argued that supervenience generates unavoidable confounding problems for interventionist accounts of causation, to the point that we must choose between interventionism and supervenience. According to one solution, the dilemma can be defused by excluding non-causal determinants of an outcome as potential confounders. I argue that this solution undermines the methodological validity of causal tests. Moreover, we don’t have to choose between interventionism and supervenience in the first place. Some confounding problems are effectively circumvented by experimental designs routinely employed in science. The remaining confounding issues concern the physical interpretation of variables and cannot be solved by choosing between interventionism and supervenience. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
Full text from SpringerLink