Why Would Bond Referenda Ever Fail? Do They?

Autor: William Spangar Peirce
Rok vydání: 2016
Předmět:
Zdroj: Explorations in Public Sector Economics ISBN: 9783319478265
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-47828-9_6
Popis: Local bond referenda provide the best available information to test whether agenda setters prefer higher levels of public investment than do the voters. This study examines the entire population of local bond referenda in Ohio from 1963 through 1987. The results do tend to support the hypothesis that agenda setters attempt to raise expenditures above the level preferred by the median voter. Although about half of all referenda fail, most projects eventually pass–as is predicted by the hypothesis of expenditure maximization.
Databáze: OpenAIRE