Epistemology without guidance

Autor: N P Hughes
Rok vydání: 2021
Předmět:
Zdroj: Philosophical Studies. 179:163-196
ISSN: 1573-0883
0031-8116
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-021-01655-8
Popis: Epistemologists often appeal to the idea that a normative theory must provide useful, usable, guidance to argue for one normative epistemology over another. I argue that this is a mistake. Guidance considerations have no role to play in theory choice in epistemology. I show how this has implications for debates about the possibility and scope of epistemic dilemmas, the legitimacy of idealisation in Bayesian epistemology, uniqueness versus permissivism, sharp versus mushy credences, and internalism versus externalism.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz: