Political polarization, term length and too much delegation
| Autor: | Carsten Hefeker |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Delegate Sociology and Political Science Delegation media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Face (sociological concept) Preference Adaptability 0506 political science Term (time) Microeconomics Philosophy Incentive 0502 economics and business 050602 political science & public administration 050207 economics Predictability Law media_common |
| Zdroj: | Constitutional Political Economy. 30:50-69 |
| ISSN: | 1572-9966 1043-4062 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10602-018-9265-2 |
| Popis: | What is the strategic incentive for governments and societies to delegate decision making to independent agents? I develop a framework taking into account preference uncertainty and the term length of independent agents in an environment with electoral and preference uncertainty and political polarization. Governments and societies face a trade-off concerning the predictability of decisions and the adaptability of to changing preferences. I find that governments, in general, tend to delegate too much and for too long from the point of view of society. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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