Relisting: An Unexamined Feature of Supreme Court Decision Making
| Autor: | Harold J. Spaeth |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2004 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Justice System Journal. 25:143-158 |
| ISSN: | 2327-7556 0098-261X |
| Popis: | Relisting began early in the Burger Court presumably because of the Supreme Court's steadily increasing docket. Any justice for any reason at any stage could have a case held over until the Court's next conference. More than two-thirds of the relisted cases concern civil liberties, the Court's most salient issue area. Approximately a third of relistings occur for legal reasons; the remainder appear attitudinal, with individual justices voting compatibly with their policy preferences. The justices' behavior seems primarily motivated to gain sufficient votes either to grant or deny cert and, if granted, to prevail on the merits. Except for the liberals Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan, relisting justices are usually members of the ultimately prevailing outcome coalition. This analysis revealed little strategic behavior in relisting, but does indicate that strategizing may explain behavior in the small number of cases in which relisting justices switched their votes from affirm to reverse, and vice versa. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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