Mediators in position auctions
| Autor: | Moshe Tennenholtz, Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2009 |
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Economics and Econometrics Non-cooperative game Sequential game ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Outcome (game theory) Commerce Mediator Complete information Economics Repeated game Common value auction Set (psychology) Mathematical economics Finance |
| Zdroj: | Games and Economic Behavior. 67:2-21 |
| ISSN: | 0899-8256 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.005 |
| Popis: | A mediator is a reliable entity which plays on behalf of the players who give her the right to play. The mediator acts in a pre-specified way based on messages received from the players. However, a mediator cannot enforce behavior; that is, players can play in the game directly without the mediator's help. A mediator generates a new game for the players, the mediated game. The outcome in the original game of an equilibrium in the mediated game is called a mediated equilibrium. Monderer and Tennenholtz introduced a theory of mediators for games with complete information. We extend the theory of mediators to games with incomplete information, and apply the new theory to position auctions, a central topic in electronic commerce. We provide a minimal set of conditions on position auctions, which is sufficient to guarantee that the VCG outcome function is a mediated equilibrium in these auctions. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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