How Harms Can Be Better than Benefits: Reply to Carlson, Johansson, and Risberg

Autor:	Neil Feit
Rok vydání:	2021
Předmět:	Counterfactual thinking Philosophy Harm Argument Sociology Object (philosophy) Epistemology
Zdroj:	Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 100:628-633
ISSN:	1471-6828 0004-8402
DOI:	10.1080/00048402.2021.1951781
Popis:	I respond here to an argument given recently in this journal by Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson, and Olle Risberg. The authors object to the counterfactual comparative account of harm. They argue that...
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::97ba6eef6d448ac1dcbcfbe30b7ff2f6 https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2021.1951781 Zobrazit plný text záznamu