Dynamic Models for Coordinating Private and Public Interests in Economic Corruption
| Autor: | G. A. Ugol’nitskii, A. B. Usov |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
0209 industrial biotechnology
Computer Networks and Communications Computer science Corruption media_common.quotation_subject Control (management) Subject (philosophy) 02 engineering and technology 01 natural sciences Theoretical Computer Science Microeconomics 020901 industrial engineering & automation Economic impact analysis 0101 mathematics media_common business.industry Applied Mathematics Interpretation (philosophy) 010102 general mathematics Robotics Mechatronics Dynamic models Control and Systems Engineering Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Artificial intelligence business Software Information Systems |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International. 59:39-48 |
| ISSN: | 1555-6530 1064-2307 |
| DOI: | 10.1134/s1064230720010128 |
| Popis: | Dynamic game-theoretic models of fighting against the corrupt behavior of subjects in the models for coordinating private and public interests are considered. The case of the economic impact of an upper-level subject on a lower-level subjects is investigated. An algorithm for finding equilibria in the case of impulsion is described. Examples of calculations for various sets of input data are presented. A meaningful interpretation of the results is discussed. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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