Emissions Trading with Non-signatories in a Climate Agreement-an Analysis of Coalition Stability

Autor:	Ottmar Edenhofer, Ulrike Kornek, Robert Marschinski, Kai Lessmann, Michael Finus
Rok vydání:	2013
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics media_common.quotation_subject Carbon offset International economics Clean Development Mechanism Microeconomics Incentive restrict Economics Kyoto Protocol Emissions trading Treaty Welfare media_common
Zdroj:	The Manchester School. 82:82-109
ISSN:	1463-6786
Popis:	We investigate how different designs of carbon offset mechanisms, like the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), affect the success of self-enforcing climate treaties. In a game-theoretic numerical model of coalition formation we find that participation in the agreement is negatively affected when strategic behavior and free-rider incentives matter. This does not change when selling targets restrict credit supply. Substantially higher participation emerges when the treaty restricts its signatories not to use the gains from credit trading to lower their emission caps. Despite the high sensitivity of participation to different CDM design, we find that global welfare levels achieved in various equilibria are remarkably similar.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::902aa1e1d3938efbe4075f4330c76ef7 https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12045 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text