Concluding Early Agreements in the EU: A Double Principal-Agent Analysis of Trilogue Negotiations
| Autor: | Thomas Laloux, Tom Delreux |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
050502 law
Economics and Econometrics Presidency Delegation Process (engineering) Parliament business.industry media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Principal–agent problem International trade General Business Management and Accounting 0506 political science Negotiation Political Science and International Relations Market stability 050602 political science & public administration Institution Sociology Business and International Management business 0505 law media_common Law and economics |
| Zdroj: | JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies. 56:300-317 |
| ISSN: | 0021-9886 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/jcms.12633 |
| Popis: | Applying a principal-agent perspective on trilogue negotiations, this article examines how the rapporteur and the Presidency, as agents of respectively the European Parliament and the Council, are able to reach a deal with their fellow agent while avoiding an involuntary defection among their principals. Despite these intra- and inter-institutional constraints, early agreements can be concluded because agents execute two parallel tasks on behalf of their principals: representing them inter-institutionally and acting as the deal-facilitator intra-institutionally. We identify three ways in which the agents can combine these two acts of delegation and conclude an early agreement: (1) creating a tied-hand situation for themselves; (2) affecting the intra-institutional coalition formation by bringing in allies from the other institution; and (3) actively searching for signals from the principals and the fellow agent on the zone of possible agreement. We illustrate these dynamics through a case study of the policy-making process on the 2015 Decision on the Market Stability Reserve. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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