| Popis: |
First part of the paper describes various attempts and methodological justifications for the reducing cognitive factors to the social ones. Bloor s and Bantes “Strong program in the sociology of knowledge” is one of the recent programs with such an aim. The critics of the “strong programmers”, however, have so far treated the strong program as a theory, and the result was more or less devastating (the adherents of the “strong program”, on the other side, have developed their own modes of speech very similar to the strong program, as to avoid attacks directed to Bloor and Barnes). Such an identification, leaning on ambiguities between the notions of “program” and “theory”, it is claimed, is higly misleading. In spite of often unjustified criticisms, among scientitists (philosophers excluded) there is a growing tedency to observe the ample range of social influences in science as constitutive traits in scientific activity. (One of the reasons is the failure to give an adequate demaraction criterion, which was essential to the rationalists). The strong program has all the features of Lakatosian research programmes, so according to the normes raised by “slrong programmers” opponents, even if it fails to meet some of the methodological norms, the core of the program would still be vindicated. So far (without a historical distance and without a better competitor), we may, at least, justifiably say that it is not degenerating. |
