Aspects of complexity in citizen–bureaucrat corruption: an agent-based simulation model
| Autor: | Jana Zausinová, Martin Zoričak, Marcel Volosin, Vladimír Gazda |
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| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Opportunity cost Corruption media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Investment (macroeconomics) 01 natural sciences 010305 fluids & plasmas Value of information Social group Microeconomics State (polity) Complete information 0502 economics and business 0103 physical sciences Cost analysis Business 050207 economics Business and International Management media_common |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination. 15:527-552 |
| ISSN: | 1860-7128 1860-711X |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11403-019-00240-x |
| Popis: | In this paper, the complexity-based approach is used to analyse corruption and its internal economics and dynamics. To better understand the drivers of corruption, we employ an agent-based model with heterogeneous agents (bureaucrats and citizens), the interactions of which determine the level of corruption in a society. The emergence of a prevailing social norm of corruption is shown to be significantly influenced by the initial conditions (i.e., history and habits). A cost analysis demonstrates that a relatively limited financial investment is required for the phase transition from the corrupt to the non-corrupt state. The concept of opportunity costs is used to express the value of information shared within an agent’s social group that improves agent decision-making. Incomplete information and uncertainty in the legal system help to reduce corruption by promoting a fear of engaging in corruption in a society. The results of this research may offer useful insights for informing an effective anti-corruption policy. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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