Ultimate parent's board reform and controlling shareholder entrenchment: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China
| Autor: | Yue Xu, Guilong Cai, Yamin Zeng, Junsheng Zhang, Sujuan Xie |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
050208 finance Natural experiment business.industry 05 social sciences Subsidiary Accounting Shareholder Expropriation Salient 0502 economics and business Pyramid Parent company Business Business and International Management 050203 business & management Management control system |
| Zdroj: | Emerging Markets Review. 38:389-403 |
| ISSN: | 1566-0141 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.ememar.2018.11.002 |
| Popis: | This paper examines whether the strengthening of board monitoring at the level of the ultimate parent company reduces their expropriation from the listed subsidiaries. Using a quasi-natural experiment in China, we find that a high presence of outside directors on the ultimate parent company significantly reduce the parent company's tunneling from listed subsidiaries. Furthermore, the ultimate parent's board monitoring in reducing the tunneling is more salient when the ultimate parent company has strong management control in listed subsidiaries and complicated pyramid ownership structure in the listed subsidiaries. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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