Organizational governance and employee pay: how ownership structure affects the firm's compensation strategy
| Autor: | Henry L. Tosi, Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, Steve Werner |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2005 |
| Předmět: |
Structure (mathematical logic)
Labour economics Executive compensation ComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSION Strategy and Management media_common.quotation_subject Compensation (psychology) ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING Compensation strategy Business Business and International Management Function (engineering) Organizational governance media_common |
| Zdroj: | Strategic Management Journal. 26:377-384 |
| ISSN: | 1097-0266 0143-2095 |
| DOI: | 10.1002/smj.452 |
| Popis: | This research investigated how the ownership structure is related to the firm's overall compensation strategy. The findings extend previous research that focused primarily on CEO compensation strategy. We show that there are significant differences in the compensation practices that apply to all employees as a function of the ownership structure. The results show that for owner-controlled firms and owner-managed firms there is significant pay/performance sensitivity for all employees. In management-controlled firms, changes in pay are related to changes in size of the firm. These findings lead us to conclude that ownership structure not only affects upper management's pay, but also the pay of all employees through substantial differences in the firm's compensation practices. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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