Hardware Trojan Designs Based on High-Low Probability and Partitioned Combinational Logic With a Malicious Reset Signal
| Autor: | Weitao Pan, Zhang Xinyuan, Jiang-Yi Shi, Zhengguang Tang, Pei-Jun Ma, Li Pengfei |
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| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
010302 applied physics
Combinational logic Very-large-scale integration Computer science business.industry 02 engineering and technology 01 natural sciences Signal 020202 computer hardware & architecture CMOS Hardware Trojan Embedded system Logic gate 0103 physical sciences 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering False positive rate Electrical and Electronic Engineering business Reset (computing) |
| Zdroj: | IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems II: Express Briefs. 68:2152-2156 |
| ISSN: | 1558-3791 1549-7747 |
| Popis: | To counteract logic-testing methods and trust verification methods for hardware Trojan (HT) detection, two HT design strategies based on high-low probability and partitioned combinational logic with a malicious reset signal are proposed. Using these two strategies, a power consumption HT and a forced reset HT are designed in a self-developed RISC-V processor. The processor is implemented using SMIC 55nm CMOS technology. Experiments show that, compared to the HTs designed with low-probability nets, the HTs designed with high-low probability strategy can reduce the triggering probability by 87.5%. The HT designed by partitioning combinational logic strategy can increase the false positive rate of HT to 40%. The result can defeat FANCI effectively. In order to enhance the stealth of the HTs, we partitioned combinational logic by using flip-flops with a malicious reset signal. The reset signal participates as a part of the trigger condition, which significantly reduces the trigger probability of HTs. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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