Hardware Trojan on SIMON Architecture for Key Retrieval
| Autor: | K. K. Soundra Pandian, Sivappriya Manivannan |
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| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Applications and Techniques in Information Security ISBN: 9789811508707 ATIS |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-981-15-0871-4_19 |
| Popis: | The need of an hour is the research on design and impacts of Hardware Trojan Horse in a crypto module to serve the purpose of secret key recovery. SIMON is a light weight block cipher that indulges to optimally work with hardware environment. Few papers have come up with the fault attack on SIMON cipher. In this paper, two bit toggle fault attack on 29\(^{th}\) round of the SIMON by intruding Hardware Trojan Horse is realized. The structural design of Hardware Trojan includes activation of two payloads with a single trigger. In consequence, the round key of SIMON cipher is retrieved by executing Differential Fault Analysis, using the fault free and completely faulty ciphertext. The power consumption of the SIMON design for both with and without Hardware Trojan is estimated using Simulation Activity Information File (.saif) on ZYNQ 7000 SoC family FPGA board and observed that there is minimal overhead of 1.32%. Provided, almost negligible difference of one LUT in area utilization is discerned. This infers that the insertion of designed HTH in the SIMON module have created an imperceptible impact and bypasses the testing process. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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