A note on Dasgupta’s Generalism
| Autor: | Lorenzo Cocco, Joshua Babic |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Philosophy of mind
Predicate functor logic media_common.quotation_subject Philosophy 05 social sciences Metaphysics 06 humanities and the arts 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology Epistemology Philosophy of language Denial 060302 philosophy 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences media_common |
| Zdroj: | Philosophical Studies. 177:2153-2162 |
| ISSN: | 1573-0883 0031-8116 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11098-019-01303-2 |
| Popis: | Dasgupta (Philos Stud Int J Philos Anal Tradit 145(1):35–67, 2009) has argued that material individuals, such as particles and laptops, are metaphysically objectionable and must be eliminated from our fundamental theories of the world. He proposes to eliminate them by redescribing all the fundamental facts of the world in a variant of predicate functor logic. We study the status, on this theory, of a putative fact particularly recalcitrant to a formulation within predicate functor logic: his own claim that there are no fundamental or primitive material individuals. We consider three regimentations of the denial of primitive individuals and show that—under some plausible hypotheses about fundamental truths and the fundamentality operator—they cannot be consistently translated in predicate functor logic by Dasgupta’s usual strategy. We conclude by discussing two approaches to salvage Generalism, in the absence of such a translation. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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