| Popis: |
In this chapter, I consider and respond to three objections to permissivism about epistemic rationality. The first, given voice by Daniel Greco and Brian Hedden (2016) and also Ben Levinstein (2017), begins with the claim that we should defer to rationality and claims that this is incompatible with permissivism. I show that the version of deference that this objection requires is false. The second objection is due to Sophie Horowitz (2014) and challenges the permissivist to say what is valuable about rationality. I respond that the epistemic utility theorist is particularly well placed to answer this question. The third objection comes from Ginger Schultheis (2018), who notes that nearly all permissivists will think there are situations in which you know of one credal state that is rationally permissible that it is, while not knowing of another that is rationally permissible that it is. But, Schultheis argues, such a situation is impossible. I respond that it is not. |
