On the SEC's 2010 enforcement cooperation program

Autor:	Michelle Liu, Andrew J. Leone, Edward Xuejun Li
Rok vydání:	2021
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Misconduct Good faith 050208 finance Accounting 0502 economics and business 05 social sciences Prosecutorial discretion 050201 accounting Business Enforcement Finance Law and economics
Zdroj:	Journal of Accounting and Economics. 71:101355
ISSN:	0165-4101
Popis:	This study examines changes in SEC enforcement and firm cooperation after the SEC introduced its new cooperation program in 2010. While previous research shows that the SEC penalized cooperative firms prior to 2010, our results suggest that after that year, it rewarded cooperation, especially good faith actions. We also find that after 2010, the SEC increased mentions of cooperation in public speeches and publicized more details about firm cooperative activities in AAERs. Finally, we find some evidence that misconduct firms increased good faith cooperation after the SEC revised its cooperation program in 2010. Our findings suggest that having a more explicit leniency program improves its effectiveness.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::83ad57197f7cb39123151096f2e0481e https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2020.101355 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full Text from ScienceDirect