On the Formal Consistency of the Principal Principle
| Autor: | Gergei Bana |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
History
05 social sciences Principal (computer security) Of the form Probability and statistics 06 humanities and the arts Extension (predicate logic) 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology Philosophy Consistency (negotiation) History and Philosophy of Science If and only if 060302 philosophy Econometrics 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Value (mathematics) Mathematical economics Mathematics Event (probability theory) |
| Zdroj: | Philosophy of Science. 83:988-1001 |
| ISSN: | 1539-767X 0031-8248 |
| DOI: | 10.1086/687932 |
| Popis: | Redei and Gyenis (2013) suggest that Lewis’s Principal Principle is meaningful only if it satisfies certain consistency conditions: starting from any assignment of subjective probabilities (credences) to some algebra of events, we should always be able to extend our algebra with events of the form “the value of the objective probability (chance) of event E is p” and assign subjective probabilities to such events in a consistent manner. We show that this extension is indeed possible in most cases. However, we also argue that this requirement is not necessary: the Principal Principle concerns subjective believes about objective chance, hence events concerning those probabilities are meant to be in the algebra initially, as Lewis’s text suggests clearly. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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