The Attenuating Effect of Intelligent Agents and Agent Autonomy on Managers' Ability to Diffuse Responsibility for and Engage in Earnings Management

Autor:	Mary B. Curtis, Peter Kipp, Ziyin Li
Rok vydání:	2020
Předmět:	050208 finance business.industry media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Accounting 050201 accounting Public relations computer.software_genre Intelligent agent Earnings management 0502 economics and business Psychology business computer Autonomy Moral disengagement media_common
Zdroj:	Accounting Horizons. 34:143-164
ISSN:	1558-7975 0888-7993
DOI:	10.2308/horizons-19-133
Popis:	SYNOPSIS Advances in IT suggest that computerized intelligent agents (IAs) may soon occupy many roles that presently employ human agents. A significant concern is the ethical conduct of those who use IAs, including their possible utilization by managers to engage in earnings management. We investigate how financial reporting decisions are affected when they are supported by the work of an IA versus a human agent, with varying autonomy. In an experiment with experienced managers, we vary agent type (human versus IA) and autonomy (more versus less), finding that managers engage in less aggressive financial reporting decisions with IAs than with human agents, and engage in less aggressive reporting decisions with less autonomous agents than with more autonomous agents. Managers' perception of control over their agent and ability to diffuse their own responsibility for financial reporting decisions explain the effect of agent type and autonomy on managers' financial reporting decisions.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7f6a3239793b212332255909df7b8cbf https://doi.org/10.2308/horizons-19-133 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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